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ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY OF
STATE AND FEDERAL JUDGES--NOT!!!
Title 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, enacted as part of the Ku
Klux Klan Act of
1871, creates the primary remedy for deprivation of federal constitutional
rights by state or local officials. Section 1983 reads:
"Every person who, under
color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects,
or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress."
Although enacted as part of a legislative package designed
to deal with
southern racial problems, Section 1983 reaches not only deprivation
of equal
protection, but of any right which may properly be characterized as
springing from the Constitution. As Representative Dawes said,
in
supporting Section 1983's enactment:
"[t]he rights, privileges,
and immunities of the American citizen,
secured to him under the Constitution of the United States, are the
subject-matter of this bill.
They are not defined in it, and there
is no attempt
in it to put limitations upon any of them; but
whatever they
are, however broad or important,
however minute or small, however
estimated by the American citizen himself, or by his legislature, they
are in this law".
CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE, 42nd
Congress, 1st Session 475 (1871). See
also the
statement of Section 1983's author, Representative
Shellabarger, id.
at appendix 68.
Recent commentary suggests that Section 1983's protections
may extend
only to a limited set of constitutional rights. This is inconsistent
with
the view which almost all courts have taken of Section 1983.
A review of
the legislative history cited reveals that it has either been quoted
out of
context by the United States Supreme Court and the lower federal courts
in
many judicial immunity and other public official immunity cases, or
it has
been mistakenly only applied to sections of the Ku Klux Klan Act other
than
Section 1983.
Federal court jurisdiction for litigation of Section 1983
claims and of
other federal civil rights causes of action is provided by 28 U.S.C.
1343.
Congress from time to time has enacted other causes of action for the
protection of particular constitutional or statutory civil rights.
Section
1983's coverage of the broad spectrum of constitutional rights, however,
has
made it far and away the most popular of civil rights statutes.
This broad and flexible civil remedy was limited, however,
by the 1967
decision in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). Over the dissent
of Mr.
Justice Douglas, the U.S. Supreme Court held state court judges immune
from
Section 1983 damages. However, a clear reading of the Pierson
case shows
that the Supreme Court justices made major mistakes and inappropriately
gutted the Civil Rights Act with respect to judicial immunity.
Much of the
Section 1983 litigation has been against state judges. Plaintiffs
in such
lawsuits have often been state prisoners suing pro se. Many of
the actions
have been frivolous litigation and inartfully drawn actions by laymen
with
limited educational backgrounds. But some the litigation has
brought
positive results in overturning barbaric prison conditions (Holt v.
Sarver,
300 F.Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969), inhuman or incecent treatment of
prisoners
in jails (Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F.Supp.674 (N.D.Cal. 1966), suing
entire
appellate court panels for alleged misconduct at arraignments and suing
judges in all other
types of proceedings. Attempts to dispose summarily of such cases
on shaky
procedural grounds have not always met with approval in the federal
appellate courts.
In the Pierson decision the Supreme Court confined their
search for
legislative intent to the debates of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871,
of which
Section 1983 was the first section. These debates back then,
however, are
singularly unenlightening, for in them Section 1983 received scant
and
perfunctory attention. Despite it primacy in the bill and despite
its
importance today, in 1871 Section 1983 was by far the least controversial
portion of a politically explosive package which also included a grant
of
unprecedented peacetime powers to the federal government. Furthermore,
it
was well understood that Section 1983 was to be modeled directly upon
a
statute, now known as 18 U.S.C. 242, which provides a criminal analog
to
Section 1983 in virtually identical language and which had been fully
discussed by Congress in 1866. Both the author and most of the
proponents
of Section 1983 were members of that Congress. As Section 1983's
author
said in discussing it:
"[m]y first inquiry is as
to the warrant which we have for enacting
such a section as this.
The model for it will be found in the
second section
of the act of April 9, 1866,
known as the "civil rights act". That
section provides a criminal proceeding in identically the same case
as
this one provides a civil
remedy for..."
CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE, 42nd
Congress, 1st Session appendix 68 (1871).
(Representative Shellabarger)
The 1866 Act was directed primarily at state judicial behavior.
Both the
House and the Senate debates confirm that the criminal nature of the
Act's
penalties extended to state judges. In each house of Congress,
hostile
questions as to whether state judges would be criminally liable were
met
with unequivocal affirmatives from the Act's sponsors and supporters.
See
the Remarks of Senator Trumbull (Senate sponsor of the bill), being
interrogated by Senator Cowan, CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE, 39th Congress,
1st
Session 475-476 (1865-1866); and colloquy between Representatives Thayer
and
Eldridge. Id. at 1154-1155.
In further proceedings on the 1866 Act, the propriety and
constitutionality of federal imposition of criminal liability upon
state
judges was the subject of bitter debate. While the debate demonstrated
that
there was considerable opposition to criminal liability for state judges,
it
is equally clear that all parties understood that such criminal liability
was intended by the Civil Rights Act. On at least two occasions
amendments
to delete the imposition of criminal liability on state judges were
unsuccessfully introduced. Interestingly enough, the second such
amendment
would have substituted "civil liability" for judges (in words almost
identical to Section 1983) for criminal liability. The Act's
sponsor, in
opposing this amendment, pertinently commented that the issues as to
criminal and civil liability were identical--if Congress could
constitutionally make judges civilly liable, it could constitutionally
make
them criminally liable and vice versa. Id. at 1925 (statement
of
Representative Wilson).
Based on the recent history of case decisions handed down
by the U.S.
Supreme Court and other federal courts, the proposition that Section
1983
leaves the common law of judicial immunity intact, while the statute
upon
which it was consciously modeled abrogates it) approaches the incredible.
If the test is one of Congressional purpose (as it surely is), no absolute
immunity for state judges can be read into Section 1983. As Mr.
Justice
Douglas pointed out in his Pierson v. Ray dissent at 386 U.S. at 563-64,
Ex
Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879), holds that a state judge may
constitutionally be subjected to federal criminal liability for violating
federal civil rights. There can therefore be no serious doubt
of the
constitutionality of federal civil liability for state judges.
Barring
constitutional impediments, whether or not state judges are to be liable
under the Civil Rights Act is a matter solely left to Congress.
It may be suggested that the equivalency of criminal versus
civil
liability is not so clear as is assumed by the argument in the text
of
Pierson. But, however correct such a suggestion might be in general,
it is
not applicable to the Civil Rights Act debate. First, as we have
seen, the
author of the Civil Rights Act (and presumably a majority of his fellow
Congressmen) considered the issues of civil and criminal liability
to be the
same. Second, the federal courts have repeatedly held that criminal
statutes enacted for the protection of a particular class from a particular
harm endow the intended beneficiaries thereof with a civil cause of
action
for their violation. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S.
426
(1964)(construing provisions of Securities and Exchange Act for the
enforcement of which only criminal penalties are provided, to create
civil
cause of action); Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir.
1943)(civil cause of action impliedly created by congressional prohibition
of wire tapping). Indeed, that very principle has been applied
to hold that
Sections 1981 and 1982, the only enforcement of which was by the general
criminal prohibition now contained in 18 U.S.C. Section 242 (1964),
create
civil causes of action both for damages and for an injunction.
Sullivan v.
Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
The possibility of a judge's being held liable in damages
for a good
faith mistake or even for a negligent mistake is the one thing proponents
of
judicial immunity fear. But as commentary suggests, the appropriate
standard for Section 1983 judicial liability is one of "actual malice",
a
term which is defined to include "reckless disregard". These
definitions
can be found in every State Tort Claims Act as they apply to government
officials and employees. A review of the 1866 debate amply supports
the
proposition that Section 1983's authors intended it to provide for
partial
immunity for mistakes. The Act's Senate sponsor and its other
supporters
vigorously denied that state judges who "innocently" infringed upon
the
rights conferred by the statute would be liable. Rather, they said,
state
judges would be liable only if they acted "acted knowingly, viciously
or
oppressively, in disregard of a law of the United States..."
CONGRESSIONAL
GLOBE, 39 Congress, 1st Session 1758 (1865-66) (statement of
Senator
Trumbull).
However, as we have seen the history of absolute judicial
immunity unfold
in the past 10 years, the U.S. Supreme Court has given judges absolute
immunity protection even if they act with malice or corruptly.
Now, the new
standard is a two-pronged test: (1) Was the judge acting within
his/her
jurisdiction and the act is a function normally performed by a judge;
(2)
whether the parties dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.
The U.S.
Supreme Court has undermined the whole Civil Rights Act, as it pertains
to
judges, and has allowed tyranny to present itself. The
Supreme Court has held that if a judge has acted maliciously it is of no
moment because a judge "should not have to have fear that unsatisfied litigants
may hound him [or her] with litigation charging malice or corruption".
See, Pierson v.
Ray, supra; accord Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356, rehearing
denied,
436 U.S. 951 (1978); Forrester v. White, 108 S.Ct. 538, 544 (1988).
These
rulings are beyond the scope and authority of the U.S. Supreme Court
and are
only allowed within the province of Congress.
Judges should be liable with Section 1983 if (1) he/she
has knowingly
erred as to law or fact, or both, or erred with reckless disregard
of making
the proper decision; and (2) if this was done for the purpose of harming
the
victim or discriminating against the victim or his class or of depriving
him
of his constitutional rights. Such a standard would exclude even
an
intentional misconstruction of law or misfinding of fact when not committed
for a discriminatory purpose or to infringe on constitutional rights.
Difficulties in standards of proof to find judges liable
may prove
extremely difficult for plaintiffs. Proving that a judge's error
in
deciding one or more complex legal issues or factual questions was
knowing
rather than merely negligent or even incompetent will be difficult
to prove.
These difficulties of proof are surmountable, however, where there
are
blatant cases of judicial malfeasance to which Congress intended judicial
liability to apply. The difficulties of proof will increase in
exact
proportion as the judicial decision is less clearly motivated by prejudice
and involves more complex questions of law and/or fact as to which
good
faith error is possible.
The proposed standard of liability for judges requires
proof of two
distinct elements: (1) intentional or reckless error and malice;
(2) class
discrimination or intentional deprivation of constitutional rights.
Proof
of one of these elements will tend to go hand in hand with the other.
Once
the proof of intentional error is made, the burden shifts to the defendant
judge to go forward with evidence that he was actuated by something
other
than malice or prejudice. Proof that a judge was prejudiced against
a
particular defendant or civil litigant (notice the two different
terminologies used to differentiate criminal and civil proceedings)
might
support an inference that a gross error was knowing or reckless rather
than
merely incompetent.
Because most of Section 1983 litigation has involved only
injunctive
relief there has been little discussion of Section 1983 damage claims.
An
outstanding source on damages claims is found in Niles, "Civil Actions
for
Damages under the Federal Civil Rights Acts", TEXAS L.REV. 1015 (1967).
The
antiquarian language of the Civil Rights statute broadly, but
unenlighteningly, authorizes "an action at law, suit in equity, or
other
proper proceeding for redress". The remedial resources available
to a
Section 1983 plaintiff must be read in light of 42 U.S.C. Section 1988
which, in language both complex and verbose, requires federal courts
to
adopt any remedy available under the law of the state in which they
sit
where necessary to effectuate the civil rights laws. Thus, Section
1988
declares a simple, direct abbreviated test: `What is needed in
the
particular case under scrutiny to make the civil rights statutes fully
effective?' Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401, 409 (5th Cir. 1965)(state
wrongful death statute adopted into the case to provide cause of action
for
wife of Negro beaten to death by sheriff), cited with approval in Sullivan
v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 240 (1969). Both federal
and state
rules on damages may be utilized, whichever better serves the policies
expressed in the federal [civil rights] statutes--although Section
1983
authorizes punitive damages with or without compensatory damages regardless
of whether state law would do so. Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74
(3d Cir.
1965)(punitive damages available without proof of compensatory damages,
though punitive damages not so available under state law).
Damage suffered as a result of knowing judicial error or
misconduct seems
roughly divisible into two categories: (1) actual demonstrable
damage; and
(2) loss of constitutional rights. Constitutional rights deprived
by
knowing judicial error or misconduct would presumably be either due
process
or the right to equal treatment in judicial proceedings (a subcategory
of
equal protection of the law), or both. But they could also include
other
constitutional rights, as for instance where the judicial misconduct
had
been motivated by desire to punish the plaintiff for his opinions or
associations. A person against whom an adverse judgment (civil
or criminal)
is rendered through judicial misconduct will suffer demonstrable
consequential damages in the form of counsel and other fees expended
to
appeal, time served in jail or cost of bail pending appeal. Counsel
fees
and other costs in a successful appeal of a criminal conviction resulting
from a false arrest were recovered in Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d
536 (10th
Cir. 1963). Costs of counsel and other fees to defend against
a criminal
charge brought subsequent to a false arrest were recovered in both
McArthur
v. Pennington, 253 F.Supp. 420 (E.D.Tenn. 1963); and Brooks v. Moss,
242
F.Supp. 531 (W.D.S.C. 1965). Shepardizing of cases necessary.
Where the judicial misconduct did not relate to or result
in an adverse
judgment (as, for instance, where the person aggrieved is a witness
subjected to verbal abuse because of his race), the only damages would
be
humiliation and emotional distress. Emotional distress of varying
types may
be suffered both where a verdict was rendered against the Section 1983
plaintiff and where it was not. A party who loses a case through
judicial
misconduct, but who was not subjected to public humiliation, may
nevertheless suffer considerable anxiety and emotional distress until
that
judgment is corrected on appeal. A party who has suffered an
adverse
judgment and been publicly humiliated, as, for instance, by being held
in
contempt for refusal to answer questions addressed to her by her first
name
will suffer both varieties of emotional harm.
The gravamen of a Section 1983 complaint is deprivation
of constitutional
rights. It has repeatedly been held that deprivation of such
rights is
remediable in damages without proof of other loss.
"...While traditional
tort-law damage rules may be appropriate to
accomplish some of the civil rights statutes' purposes, the tort-law
rules do not allow full realization of those purposes because of their
emphasis upon loss-shifting rather than upon punishment and
deterrence."
Niles, "Civil Actions
for Damages under the Federal Civil Rights
Acts", 45 TEXAS
L.REV. 1015, 1026, note 51 (1967).
No mere standard of proof--however rigorous, however difficult
to
satisfy-- will answer the objections of partisans of judicial
immunity.
Their objection is not to successful litigation against judges, that
is, to
the idea that judges, like other men, should be liable for torts.
Their
objection is that for every one legitimate grievance, there will be
a
hundred or a thousand frivolous cases in which judges will be put to
the
unremunerated expense of defending successfully. The case for
complete
judicial immunity (and complete tyranny and oppression against We the
People) is perhaps most persuasively put in a classic Learned Hand
opinion:
"It does indeed go without
saying that an official, whois in fact guilty
of using his powers
to vent his spleen upon others, or for any other
personal motive not
connected with the public good, should not escape
liability for the
injuries he may so cause; and, if it were possible in
practice to confine
such complaints to the guilty, it would be
monstrous to deny recovery. The justification for doing so is
that it
is impossible to know whether the claim is well founded until the case
has been tried, and
that to submit all officials, the innocent as well
as the guilty, to
the burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of
its outcome, would
dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute,
or
the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their
duties.
Again and again the
public interest calls for action which may turn out
to be founded on a
mistake, in the face of which an official may later
find himself hard
put to it to satisfy a jury of his good faith. There
must indeed be means
of punishing public officers who have been truant
to their duties; but
that is quite another matter from exposing such as
have been honestly
mistaken to suit by anyone who has suffered from
their errors. As is so often the case, the answer must be found
in a
balance between the
evils inevitable in either alternative. In this
instance it has been
thought in the end better to leave unredressed the
wrongs done by dishonest
officers than to subject those who try to do
their duty to the
constant dread of retaliation." Gregoire v.
Biddle, 177 F.2d
579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949).
Judge Learned Hand should have immediately been removed
from the bench
for the aforementioned remarks. These were treasonous remarks
that
implicated official misconduct and obstruction of justice, not to mention
violating his Oath of Office to Uphold and Defend the Constitution.
A direct opposition and repudiation to Judge Hand's slick
opinion comes
from a member of the House Judiciary Committee, during the Civil Rights
Acts' debates in 1866. Representative Lawrence, declared:
"I answer it is better to
invade the judicial power of the State than
permit it to invade,
strike down, and destroy the civil rights of
citizens. A judicial power perverted to such uses should be speedily
invaded. The
grievance would be insignificant".
See, Briscoe v. La Hue, 103
S.Ct. 1108, 1123, 1127-1130 (1983).
Because of the high incidences of frivolous civil rights
litigation that
ultimately negatively impacts on meritorious cases, the development
of
devices which will radically decrease the incidence of frivolous litigation
removes the need for complete judicial immunity as a "balance between
the
evils inevitable in either alternative". Absolute immunity for
judges and
other government officials eliminates meritorious as well as frivolous
suits. Rights of citizens to litigate meritorious claims against
judges are
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments and perhaps by Article
III
of the Constitution for the United States of America as well.
United Mine
Workers v. Illinois State Bar, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of
R.R.
Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S.
415 (1963); Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See also Cotting
v. Kansas
City Stockyards Co., 183 U.S. 79, 102 (1901).
A further objection to damage actions against state court
judges is the
inappropriateness of the federal judiciary sitting in judgment upon
its
state counterparts. See, e.g., City of Greenwood v. Peacock,
384 U.S. 808,
828 (1967) ("The civil rights removal statute does not require and
does not
permit the judges of the federal courts to put their brethren of the
state
judiciary on trial". Id. at 828). This interesting case
can also apply
when the federal government tries to bring state Citizens into the
federal
judiciary on Income Tax cases, RICO cases and the like, or the mere
fact
that federal judges cannot grant immunity to state court judges, because
it
is only a legislative function that Congress can bring.
Chief Justice John Marshall decisively repudiated this
argument over 175
years ago when he declared federal courts to be the final and authoritative
expositors of the Constitution. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264
(1821). See also Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.)
304 (1816).
It is a little late for federal judges, who regularly review the
constitutionality of state judicial conduct (both directly and on habeas
corpus review) to assert the impropriety of such review. The
federalism
objection doesn't apply where federal criminal liability of state judges
involves discrimination in jury selection or they otherwise knowingly
violate federal constitutional standards. 18 U.S.C. Section 243; Ex
parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
Opinions asserting the impropriety of federal review of
state judicial
conduct invariably go on to suggest appellate review as the "remedy"
for
constitutional error by state judges. This ignores the fact that
appellate
review (in itself a process often involving tremendous financial and
emotional costs for the appellant) provides no compensation for the
financial, emotional, and other harms suffered as a result of the trial
court's impropriety. Appellate review is a method of correcting
judicial
error, not a remedy for judicial misconduct. To deny compensation
to
litigants whose constitutional rights have unintentionally been violated
by
an erroneous decision may, on balance, be a necessary prerequisite
to
fearless and principled judicial decision-makeing. To deny compensation
where the constitutional error was intentional and malicious, however,
is
both unjust to the litigant and harmful to the legal system as a whole.
Judicial immunity gives a state judge who is not inclined
to vindicate
constitutional rights (or who fears to do so in the face of popular
disapprobation) every reason to ignore his duty. If the litigant
lacks the
funds or perserverance to appeal, the state judge has fully accomplished
his
objective. Even if the party appeals and wins, the judge has
lost nothing.
Even though there is some point that state judges dislike their decisions
appealed and reversed, a judge who intentionally or quasi-intentionally
decides to violate a litigant's constitutional rights has probably
calculated that his satisfaction in doing so is worth the risk of eventual
appellate reversal. In this connection, it should be also remembered
that
some federal district judges have suffered scores and even hundreds
of
reversals of their decisions in civil rights cases.
At the very least, a state judge has put the litigant to
the high cost of
obtaining appellate relief. During the course of protracted appellate
proceedings, the effect of the initial ruling (as enforced, interpreted
and
complied with by eager public officials) may have been to undermine
or
destroy a civil rights movement or organization or otherwise to make
the
appellant's eventual victory fruitless. The standard of proof
in most civil
proceedings, state or federal, is the preponderance of the evidence.
But a
trial court's findings of fact can be challenged on appeal only if
"clearly
erroneous". Thus a judge who declines to vindicate constitutional
rights
can shield his decision by deliberately misfinding the facts.
Plaintiffs
seeking to vindicate constitutional rights before such a judge must,
therefore, virtually prove their cases beyond a reasonable doubt in
order to
secure appellate reversal.
No where is this more true in New Jersey state courts than
in domestic
violence courts and enforcement courts when litigants are forced to
appear
against their wills under threat of incarceration, duress and coercion,
and
over their objections on child support enforcement matters. In
both cases,
the family courts have a propensity for tremendous gender bias against
male
litigants. Male litigants are routinely imprisoned for debt in
child
support enforcement matters, while the same law that is used prohibits
incarcerating women for debt, even though state family court judges
know
that the existing laws and constitutions prohibit imprisonment for
debt in
any matter. In domestic violence matters, judges are blatantly
biased
against males to the extent that they grant over 95 percent of all
domestic
violence restraining orders against males. In child custody matters,
the
same applies. Judges routinely grant custody to females in over
90 percent
of the cases, even though the male parent may be more capable of raising
children.
Male litigants must prove beyond a reasonable doubt in
civil domestic
violence matters and civil child support enforcement matters that they
are
not guilty of violating orders of the court. Male litigants are
held to
even higher standards than beyond reasonable doubt in these family-type
matters which is unconstitutional but constantly practiced by state
court
judges. Such judicial misconduct not only deprives litigants
of their
opportunity to vindicate constitutional rights in cases actually brought,
but discourages others from bringing such cases.
State trial judges--from the justice of the peace or police
court judge
to the judge of the superior court of general jurisdiction--are among
the
most powerful and influential local officials in our country.
Their
decisions can hold a man for trial or convict and sentence him and
can
dictate the victor in civil litigation (even before a jury) as well
as the
bearer of costs and the scope of the remedy. The manner in which
they
address litigants, order their courtrooms, and otherwise perform their
judicial functions can set an example to be followed by other local
officials and can influence the attitudes of every element and individual
in
the community.
The conduct of the local judiciary, both in judicial decision-making
and
in judicial administration, probably more than the conduct of any other
state or local official, determines whether and to what extent the
abstract
guarantees of the Constitution are realized in a particular locality.
It is
no secret that all too often neither the pay nor the standards of selection
of state judges of general jurisdiction (much less justices of the
peace or
of police courts) are commensurate with the great importance of their
offices. It is also true that even the best judges, as other
men, may
sometimes feel inclined to indulge their prejudices or desires for
community
approval--particularly when they can do so without any prospect of
personal
liability. It is therefore a questionable doctrine that allows
these local
officials an absolute immunity comparable to that enjoyed by federal
cabinet
officers. A trial judge can make some of his rulings stick simply
by
fudging his findings of fact. See, e.g., Gregoire v. Biddle,
177 F.2d 579
(2d Cir. 1949).
The disinclination of the federal judiciary to sit in judgment
upon its
state brethren assures that it will do so leniently. In any case,
whether
or not state judges should be liable for intentional deprivations of
constitutional rights was settled by Congress over 125 years ago by
the Ku
Klux Klan Act of 1871. It found that judges were liable, both
criminally as
well as civilly, for constitutional rights violations. As abortion
protesters, tax protesters, human rights protesters, war protesters,
draft
resisters, fathers rights organizations, the patriot movement, and
others of
the same ilk are so often reminded, the federal courts sit not to judge
the
wisdom of Congress' wishes, but to carry those wishes out:
"We decline to void [the
statute involved] essentially on the ground
that it is unwise legislation...."
O'Brien v. United States,
391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968).
The federal judiciary cannot pick and choose what laws
it can void. It
must uphold the laws made by Congress, including the Ku Klux Klan Act
of
1871, which specifically denied state judges any immunity from civil
or
criminal liability, just as their Oaths when they took office demanded.
When suing state judges in state or federal courts, if
immunity is
granted by other judges sitting in judgment, those judges must be sued,
removed from the case, if not the bench, and judicial misconduct complaints
filed against them, for violations of constitutional rights.
Under 28
U.S.C. 372 federal judges can be removed for a disability & misconduct.
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), federal judges can and must
be
sued for being willful and malicious when violating your constitutional
rights. It is interesting to note here that federal judges grant
state
judges immunity, when the FTCA allows for federal officials (including
judges) to be sued. Each state has a Tort Claims Act which essentially
supercedes any immunities. What is that disability you ask?
They took an
Oath to Uphold and Defend the Constitution for the United States of
America,
when they became a federal judge, a state judge, a lawyer, a prosecutor,
etc. To violate that Oath indicates a severe mental imbalance
on the part
of the particular judge. The Complaint against a federal or state
judge
must be in the form of an Affidavit and sent immediately to the U.S.
Senate
Judiciary Committee, the U.S. House Judiciary Committee, each state
Senate
and Assembly(House)Judiciary Committees, the Judicial review boards
in each
state, the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, the Judicial
Council for the particular federal Circuit, the Chief Justice of the
respective state, and each respective state Bar Association (judges
in
almost every case have to be lawyers). In New Jersey, the case
of In the
Matter of Imbriani, former criminal court judge Michael Imbriani admitted
to
stealing over $175,000 from his business partners, was convicted, sentenced
to 5 years probation (even though Imbriani, while as a judge, had a
convicted white collar defendant before him for stealing the exact
same
amount, sentenced him to the maximum N.J. penalty--10 years behind
bars),
had his Bar license revoked and stands to lose his pension.
Bruce E.--Chair, NJ Council for
Children's Rights Pro Se
Network, P.O.Box 615,
Wayne, N.J. near PZ 07474
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