Christian Party

The disbarment of Moseley

WOW, EDGAR IS DUMB --

Really? WHO is dumb? WHO was disbarred for being an unethical incompetent liar? WHO lied and hid documents from the court? WHO has been caught here repeatedly using half-quotes, hiding full quotes, incompetent illogic, twisting the Bible, and outright lying to defend the hateful, perverse, and unethical Talmud? Be sure to scroll down to the court's "Conclusion."

CAN YOU SEE THIS ONE?

http://www.courts.state.va.us/opinions/opnscvwp/1061237.pdf

PRESENT: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Lemons, and Agee,

JJ., and Russell, S.J.

OPINION BY

IN RE: JONATHAN A. MOSELEY JUSTICE G. STEVEN AGEE

Record Number 061237 April 20, 2007

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY

Benjamin N.A. Kendrick, Judge

Jonathan A. Moseley appeals the judgment of the Circuit

Court of Arlington County, which revoked his “right to practice

before the Circuit Court of Arlington.” Moseley contends the

circuit court erred for two reasons: First, he argues the court

“was without jurisdiction” to revoke his right to practice.

Second, he asserts that even if the circuit court had

jurisdiction to act, it failed to provide him “notice of the

alleged misconduct” before the revocation. For the reasons set

forth below, we will affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

I. BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW

This case arises from the proceedings in two breach of

contract cases filed by Moseley on behalf of his client, Tracy

E. Ammons, against The Christian Coalition of America, Inc.

(“the Christian Coalition”). In the first suit, both parties

denied having a copy of the consulting agreement in controversy,

so the circuit court conducted an evidentiary hearing to

determine the nature of the agreement. A primary issue before

the court was whether the agreement contained an arbitration

clause, as the Christian Coalition contended, but which Ammons

denied. On cross-examination during the hearing, Ammons

testified he had found a copy of the consulting agreement, and

that he had given a copy to his attorney, Moseley, who had it in

the courtroom. Ammons further admitted that the agreement

contained an arbitration clause.

Moseley, acting on behalf of Ammons, immediately requested

a nonsuit. The circuit court stated it was compelled to grant

the nonsuit, and then strongly reprimanded Moseley for his

conduct during the course of the proceedings. In particular,

the circuit court cited Moseley’s failure to inform the court

and opposing counsel that the contract had been located and

contained the very arbitration provision he had previously

denied existed. Furthermore, the circuit court cited Moseley’s

prior filing of numerous frivolous pleadings and motions in the

matter, which needlessly wasted the time of the court and

counsel. The circuit court then awarded sanctions against

Moseley and Ammons, jointly and severally, in the amount of

$83,141.24, which represented a portion of the Christian

Coalition’s attorney’s fees and costs related to Moseley’s

actions (“the monetary sanctions award”).1

1 Moseley filed a timely notice and petition of appeal from

this order. However, on March 15, 2005, this Court dismissed

the petition for appeal under Rule 5:11 for failure to timely

file a transcript or written statement of facts. The monetary

Ammons and the Christian Coalition then entered into

arbitration proceedings concerning the Christian Coalition’s

alleged breach of the consulting agreement. While the

arbitration was ongoing, Moseley filed a second motion for

judgment on Ammons’ behalf, alleging substantially the same

claims against the Christian Coalition as in the first motion

for judgment.2 The Christian Coalition filed a motion to

disqualify Moseley from representing Ammons, asserting Moseley

had an “irreconcilable and unwaiveable per se conflict” because

his “personal interest inextricably [is] intertwined [and]

adverse to his own client.”3

On February 16, 2006, the circuit court heard argument

regarding the motion to disqualify Moseley from representing

Ammons regarding the second motion for judgment.4 Despite being

sanctions award against Moseley and Ammons is not before the

Court in this appeal. 2 The second motion for judgment attached a copy of the

consulting agreement and contended the Christian Coalition

waived its right to rely on the arbitration provisions by

defending the prior motion for judgment. 3 Among the factors the Christian Coalition cited in its

motion to disqualify were: Moseley and Ammons’ joint and several

liability for the monetary sanctions award, Moseley’s subsequent

declaration of bankruptcy that would insulate him from

collection of the monetary sanctions award, Moseley’s failure to

perfect an appeal of the monetary sanctions award, and Moseley’s

potential testimony in the pending case regarding the contract’s

arbitration clause. 4 Judge Joanne F. Alper was the presiding judge in the

proceedings related to the first motion for judgment, and

entered the monetary sanctions award. However, Judge Alper

“voluntarily recused herself for the limited purpose of hearing

sent a copy of the praecipe setting the hearing for that date,

Moseley did not appear at the hearing due to an apparent

miscommunication from the clerk’s office and the judge’s

chambers, which led Moseley to believe no hearing would occur

that day. However, the hearing did proceed as scheduled on

February 16th and the Christian Coalition argued its motion to

disqualify Moseley from the second motion for judgment

proceeding and it urged the court to consider additional

sanctions, including issuing a rule to show cause based on

Moseley’s conduct. In addition, the Christian Coalition called

David R. Rosenfeld to testify as an expert in the field of legal

ethics in Virgina. Rosenfeld testified that Moseley had a

conflict of interest with Ammons and that Moseley’s “conduct

falls well below the [ethical and professional] standard of

care” for attorneys licensed to practice law in Virginia.

Rosenfeld also testified that he examined a letter written by

and a motion filed by Moseley, and they contained “entirely

inappropriate, inaccurate, and in some instances, just downright

. . . false” allegations about Judge Alper.5

from Defendant’s Motion to Disqualify.” Judge Benjamin N.A.

Kendrick presided over the remaining proceedings relevant to

this appeal, including the February 16, 2006 and March 16, 2006

hearings. 5 Moseley’s letter and motion, which the Christian Coalition

introduced into evidence at the hearing, indicated that Judge

Alper decided to recuse herself from hearing the motion to

disqualify him from representing Ammons because she had engaged

As a result of the hearing, the circuit court entered an

order on February 27, 2006 that granted the Christian

Coalition’s motion to disqualify Moseley and further directing

Moseley “to appear before this Court on the 16[th] day of March

2006 to show cause why Moseley’s right to practice before this

Court should not be revoked.”

As directed by the circuit court, Moseley received a copy

of the February 27 order and a transcript of the February 16

hearing. Moseley petitioned the circuit court for a rehearing

regarding the February 27 order, and explained the reason for

his absence from the February 16 hearing. In light of Moseley’s

explanation, the circuit court “vacated [the February 27 order]

pending the outcome of the March 16, 2006 hearing.”

Prior to the March 16 hearing, the Christian Coalition

alerted the circuit court that it had just obtained an e-mail

written and circulated by Moseley, which the Christian Coalition

asked be considered at the March 16 hearing. Moseley was sent a

copy of both the Christian Coalition’s letter to the circuit

court and the e-mail. In the e-mail, Moseley characterized

opposing counsel as “certainly demonically empowered. I have

never seen anyone who reeks of evil so much.” Furthermore,

Moseley described the monetary sanctions award entered by Judge

in “misconduct” during the first motion for judgment

proceedings.

Alper as “an absurd decision from a whacko judge, whom I believe

was bribed.”

At the March 16 hearing, which included the Rule to Show

Cause, the circuit court directed the Christian Coalition to

reargue its motion to disqualify Moseley. In its opening

statement, the Christian Coalition argued “the evidence is

overwhelming that [Moseley] should not only be disqualified

[from representing Ammons], but within this judicial district

[have his right to practice] suspend[ed] or revoke[d],” and have

his conduct reported to the State Bar for further investigation.

The presiding judge then reiterated that those would be the

three issues before the court during the hearing.

The Christian Coalition again called David Ross Rosenfeld

as an expert witness, and he gave substantially the same

testimony as in the February 16 hearing. When asked about

Moseley’s recent e-mail, Rosenfeld testified that in his expert

opinion, “the characterization of a sitting judge as a wacko

judge constitutes a per se violation of the standard of care

established through Rule 8.2” of the Rules of Professional

Conduct in Virginia.

During the hearing, Moseley repeatedly contended that he

had not been given notice that the court was considering the

revocation of his privilege to practice before it. The circuit

court rejected Moseley’s argument, finding that Moseley had been

given adequate notice of the issue in the motion to disqualify,

the transcripts of the February 16 hearing, the specific terms

of the February 27 order, particularly the rule to show cause,

and the enunciation by counsel and the court of the issues

before it at the hearing.

The circuit court then entered an order dated March 16,

2006, finding that Moseley had “an irreconcilable [and

unwaiveable] conflict of interest” and ordered that he

“immediately terminate his representation” of Ammons. The court

also made a specific finding that Moseley “had timely, adequate,

and proper notice of this proceeding” and that it had “the

inherent power to suspend or annul the license of an attorney

practicing before it. § 54.1-3915, Code of Virginia [and] Legal

Club of Lynchburg v. Light, 137 Va. 249[, 119 S.E. 55] (1923).”

The order then recited that “Moseley’s conduct during . . . this

cause . . . raises sufficient and serious questions for this

Court regarding [his] competency and fitness to practice law

before this Court” and found Moseley had “engaged in unethical

conduct in violation of the Virginia Code of Professional

Conduct and . . . made contemptible, irresponsible and false

statements about a sitting judge.” The March 16, 2006 order

then provided that “Moseley’s right to practice before the

Circuit Court of Arlington . . . be and hereby is revoked” and

referred to the Virginia State Board and this Court

“consideration of reciprocal revocation of licensure.”

We awarded Moseley this appeal from the March 16, 2006

order as to the revocation of his privilege to practice before

the Circuit Court of Arlington County.6

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal to this Court, Moseley makes two assignments of

error. First, he contends the circuit court erred because it

“was without jurisdiction” to revoke his entitlement to practice

law before the Circuit Court of Arlington County. Second,

Moseley asserts the circuit court failed to properly provide him

“notice of the alleged misconduct” prior to taking such action.

We address each assignment of error in turn.

A. Jurisdiction of the Circuit Court

Moseley contends the Circuit Court of Arlington County did

not have jurisdiction to revoke his entitlement to practice

before it because the “whole field of disbarment in Virginia” is

now regulated by statute. He argues that because the circuit

court did not follow the procedure for disbarment set forth in

6 Moseley’s disqualification from representing Ammons and

the referral to the Virginia State Bar are not before this Court

on appeal. The underlying dispute between Ammons and the

Christian Coalition has subsequently settled. Consequently, we

granted Moseley’s motion to dismiss the Christian Coalition as

appellee in the matter and the appeal was re-styled In re

Moseley. The Court designated counsel to argue as amicus curiae

in support of the circuit court’s actions.

Code § 54.1-3935, it was without authority to act so as to bar

his practice before that court. Moseley distinguishes the

circuit court’s authority “to remove counsel in a particular

case or to punish for contempt,” and the type of action here,

which removes his ability to appear before the court.

At the outset, it is important to note that Moseley’s

license to practice law in Virginia was not affected by the

March 16, 2006 order. Licensure of an attorney, and revocation

of that license, are matters governed by statute. Code §§ 54.1-

3928, -3934 et seq. It is not within the jurisdiction of a

circuit court to adjudicate the revocation of a license to

practice law except in compliance with the statutory authority.

Code § 54.1-3935.7 The circuit court clearly recognized that

limitation because it referred any action regarding Moseley’s

license to practice law to the Virginia State Bar. A license to

practice law covers the full panoply of actions an attorney can

undertake from writing a will to representing a person in a

controversy before a court. And while the issuance of a license

to practice law carries with it certain rights for the holder of

that license, the ability to practice before a particular court

is a distinct and separate consideration.

7 Even before the unification of the various bars within the

Commonwealth and creation of the Virginia State Bar in 1938,

revocation of a license to practice law was a matter governed by

statute. Ex Parte Fisher, 33 Va. (6 Leigh) 619, 624-25 (1835).

The matter before the Court on appeal, however, is not the

status of Moseley’s license to practice law, but whether a court

can revoke his privilege to practice before a particular court

when no statute specifically provides for that action. The

answer to that query is answered by our long-standing

jurisprudence.

We addressed the basic issue now before us in 1835 in Ex

Parte Fisher, 33 Va. (6 Leigh) 619, 624-25 (1835). Our

resolution of the issue then remains as valid today as it was

nearly two centuries ago. “[I]ndependently of any statutory

restriction, the courts of record of this [C]ommonwealth might,

in a proper case, suspend or annul the license of an attorney,

so far as it authorized him to practice in the particular court,

which pronounced the sentence, but no farther.” Id. at 624.

Although the local circuit courts had jurisdiction in the

19th century both to issue a license to practice law and control

the actual practice before that court, the intervening statutory

regimen ceding licensure to the Virginia State Bar (as opposed

to the various circuit courts) has no effect on the continuing

authority of a court to regulate the privilege of practicing

before that court. We explained this concept in Legal Club of

Lynchburg:

Independent of statutory authority, all courts of

record in Virginia have inherent power in a proper

case to suspend or annul the license of an attorney

practicing in the particular court which pronounces

the sentence of disbarment.

137 Va. at 250, 119 S.E. at 55. This independent and inherent

power to regulate the lawyers practicing before it is vested in

courts as part of the authority necessary to the existence and

function of a court. See, e.g., Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S.

626, 630-31 (1962).

In Code § 54.1-3935, on which Moseley relies, the General

Assembly has set forth the procedure by which the appropriate

court is empowered to revoke or suspend a license to practice

law that affects the right to practice law throughout the

Commonwealth.8 However, as recognized in Legal Club, this

statutory authority does not curtail a court’s pre-existing and

8 Subsection (A) of Code § 54.1-3935 states:

If the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any

circuit court of this Commonwealth observes, or if a

complaint, verified by affidavit is made by any person

to such court, that any attorney has been convicted of

a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude or a felony or

has violated the Virginia Code of Professional

Responsibility, the court may assign the matter to the

Virginia State Bar for investigation. Upon receipt of

the report of the Virginia State Bar, the court may

issue a rule against such attorney to show cause why

his license to practice law shall not be revoked. If

the complaint, verified by affidavit, is made by a

district committee of the Virginia State Bar, the

court shall issue a rule against the attorney to show

cause why his license to practice law shall not be

revoked.

The remaining subsections set forth how the case will proceed

and the attorney’s rights during the proceedings. Subsection

(D) specifically authorizes the court to, inter alia, revoke or

suspend an attorney’s “license to practice law in this

Commonwealth” if the attorney is found guilty by the court.

independent authority to control those who practice before it,

including the authority to suspend or revoke an attorney’s

privilege to practice before that court. 137 Va. at 250-51, 119

S.E. at 55. “Such power does not depend for its existence upon

either constitutional or statutory provisions, but is possessed

by all courts of record, unless taken away by express

constitutional (or possibly legislative) inhibition.” Id. at

251, 119 S.E. at 55.

Although Legal Club seemed to leave open the possibility

that a legislative enactment could circumscribe a court’s

authority to discipline attorneys practicing before it, this

Court’s decision in Norfolk & Portsmouth Bar Ass’n v. Drewry,

161 Va. 833, 172 S.E. 282 (1934), annuls that possibility. In

Drewry we reiterated not only that a court has “an inherent

power” to discipline and regulate attorneys practicing before

it, but also recognized that “[t]his power, since the judiciary

is an independent branch of government, is not controlled by

statute.” 161 Va. at 836, 172 S.E. at 283. Thus, the court’s

authority to discipline attorneys and regulate their conduct in

proceedings before that court is also a constitutional power

derived from the separation of powers between the judiciary, as

an independent branch of government, and the other branches.

Va. Const. art. III, § 1; art. VI, § 1; see, e.g., Harlen v.

Helena, 676 P.2d 191, 193 (Mont. 1984); Hustedt v. Workers’

Comp. Appeals Bd., 636 P.2d 1139, 1142-44 (Cal. 1981); R.J.

Edwards, Inc. v. Hert, 504 P.2d 407, 411 (Okla. 1972); State ex

rel. Oregon State Bar v. Lenske, 407 P.2d 250, 254-56 (Or.

1965); In re Sparks, 101 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Ky. 1936). As the

circuit court implied, this inherent and constitutional power is

essentially acknowledged in Code § 54.1-3915, where even this

Court is prohibited from promulgating “any rule or regulation or

method of procedure which eliminates the jurisdiction of the

courts to deal with the discipline of attorneys.”

Our more recent cases continue to recognize this inherent

and constitutional authority of a court to discipline attorneys

apart from the formal statutory disciplinary procedures

affecting the attorney’s license to practice law. For example,

as recently as March of this year, we summarized our

jurisprudence in this area in Nusbaum v. Berlin, 273 Va. 385,

641 S.E.2d 494 (2007):

[T]his Court has recognized that the courts of this

Commonwealth have the inherent power to supervise the

conduct of attorneys practicing before them and to

discipline any attorney who engages in misconduct. A

court’s inherent power to discipline an attorney

practicing before it includes the power not only ‘to

remove an attorney of record in a case,’ [Judicial

Inquiry and Review Comm’n v. Peatross, 269 Va. 428,

447, 611 S.E.2d 392, 402 (2005)], but also ‘in a

proper case to suspend or annul the license of an

attorney practicing in the particular court.’ ”

Id. at 399, 641 S.E.2d at 501 (citations omitted). Thus, the

authority of a court to regulate the conduct of attorneys

practicing before that court by revoking or suspending that

privilege is both an inherent and a constitutional power that is

not dependent on its creation by legislative enactment and thus

cannot be limited by statute. Accordingly, under our longstanding

precedent, the circuit court had jurisdiction to revoke

Moseley’s privilege to practice before that court.9

The March 16, 2006 order by its plain terms applies only to

Moseley’s right to practice before the Circuit Court of

Arlington County. By necessity, the circuit court’s action is

the act of that court and not limited to practice before the

individual judge presiding over the case. See Commonwealth v.

Epps, 273 Va. 410, 414, 641 S.E.2d 77, 80 (2007) (In the context

of contemptuous behavior in the courtroom, “[a]ny harm in this

case was suffered by the court as an institution, not by [the

judge] personally.”). By that, we mean the order of March 16,

2006, by its very issuance, is an act binding within the

jurisdictional limits of the Circuit Court of Arlington County.

Therefore, the Circuit Court of Arlington County, which is

coterminous with the 17th judicial circuit, has authority to

regulate the conduct of attorneys throughout that circuit, but

9 Moseley raises no issue as to the sufficiency of the evidence

to support the circuit court’s judgment, nor does he raise an

issue as to whether the circuit court abused its discretion,

based on the evidence, in revoking his privilege to practice

before the court. Thus, we address neither matter. Rule

5:17(c).

no further. Indeed, as we recognized in Ex Parte Fisher, Legal

Club, and Drewry, a court’s authority in the discipline of

attorneys practicing before it is limited to the jurisdictional

boundaries of that court and cannot extend to other courts

beyond that boundary.10

For all these reasons, we conclude the circuit court had

jurisdiction to revoke Moseley’s privilege to appear in that

court and thus did not err in the judgment of March 16, 2006.

B. Notice of the Alleged Misconduct

Moseley also alleges the circuit court erred in revoking

his privilege to practice before the Circuit Court of Arlington

County “without notice of the alleged misconduct.” Although

Moseley also argues on brief the broader contention that he did

not have notice “that his right to practice law was in

jeopardy,” he made no assignment of error as to that issue. We

thus limit our review to the specific issue to which he assigned

error. Rule 5:17(c); see Chesapeake Hosp. Auth. v.

Commonwealth, 262 Va. 551, 557, 554 S.E.2d 55, 57 (2001).

10 As noted above, the March 16, 2006 order, in and of itself,

does not affect Moseley’s license to practice law. Moseley’s

license to practice law remains in effect, even within the

jurisdictional boundaries of the Circuit Court of Arlington

County; he simply cannot appear in that court. We also note

that the March 16, 2006 order, by its specific terms, applies

only to the Circuit Court of Arlington County, and does not

undertake to revoke Moseley’s privilege to practice before the

juvenile and domestic relations or general district courts of

Arlington County.

Moseley’s argument that he lacked notice of the alleged

misconduct is without merit. Courts are not required to list

with specificity their factual basis for issuing a rule to show

cause. Moreover, the record clearly shows Moseley received,

inter alia, copies of the motion to disqualify, communication

from the Christian Coalition to the court stating the intent to

raise correspondence written by Moseley (with copies of the

referenced correspondence attached), a transcript of the

February 16 hearing detailing the evidence on which the

Christian Coalition was relying to support Moseley’s

disqualification, and the issuance of a rule to show cause in

the circuit court’s February 27 order. Moseley received more

than adequate “notice of the alleged misconduct,” which was the

subject of the March 16 hearing and embodied in the findings of

the March 16, 2006 order. Thus, Moseley’s second assignment of

error also fails.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the circuit court had the

jurisdiction to revoke Moseley’s privilege to practice before

it. Moseley also had adequate notice of the conduct the circuit

court would consider in deciding on that revocation.

Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

Affirmed.

Modified Tuesday, November 02, 2010